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we compute efficiency scores and rankings by applying a range of measurement techniques. The 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of an efficient use of public resources and high-quality fiscal policies for 
economic growth and stability and for the well-being of individuals has been brought to the 
forefront by several developments over recent decades. Macroeconomic constraints limit 
countries’ scope for expenditure increases. The member states of the European Union are bound 
to fiscal discipline through the Stability and Growth Pact. Globalisation makes capital and 
taxpayers more mobile and exerts pressure on governments’ revenue base. New management and 
budgeting techniques have been developed and there is more scope for goods and service 
provision via markets. Transparency of government practices across the globe has increased, 
raising public pressure to use resources more efficiently (see Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), 
Heller (2003), Joumard, Konsgrud, Nam and Price (2004)). 
 
The adequate measurement of public sector efficiency is a difficult empirical issue and the 
literature on it is rather scarce. The measurement of the costs of public activities, the 
identification of goals and the assessment of efficiency via appropriate cost and outcome 
measures of public policies are thorny issues. Academics and economists in international 
organisations have made some progress in this regard by paying more attention to the costs of 
public activities via rising marginal tax burdens and by looking at the composition of public 
expenditure. Moreover, they have been shifting the focus of analysis from the amount of 
resources used by ministry or programme (inputs) to the services delivered or outcomes achieved 
(see, for instance, OECD (2003), and Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005)). 
 
Our contribution in this study is fourfold: first we discuss and survey conceptual and 
methodological issues related to the measurement and analysis of public sector efficiency. Second 
we construct Public Sector Performance and Efficiency composite indicators for the ten (plus 
two) new member states that adhered to the European Union (EU) on 1 May 2004 (on 2007) as 
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compared to emerging markets from different regions, and some current EU member countries 
that show features of emerging markets and/or are undergoing a catching up process. Third we 
use Data Envelopment Analysis to compute input and output efficiency scores and country 
rankings, which we combine with a Tobit analysis to see whether exogenous, non-discretionary 
(and non-fiscal) factors play a role in explaining expenditure inefficiencies. Fourth, we use the 
information from the Tobit estimations to correct the efficiency scores for the effect of non-
discretionary factors. To our knowledge, such an efficiency analysis has not been applied before 
to this set of countries. 
 
On the second and third objective, the study finds significant differences in expenditure 
efficiency across new member countries: the Asian newly industrialised economies perform best 
while the new member states show a very diverse picture. The two-step analysis shows that 
income, public sector competence and educational levels, as well as the security of property 
rights, seem to facilitate the prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector, and such factors can 
be used to correct country efficiency scores.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section two we briefly discuss our motivation and review 
the related literature on public expenditure efficiency. In section three we present the 
methodologies used for the measurement of public expenditure efficiency. Section four reports 
stylised facts and our empirical analysis of efficiency via i) performance and efficiency analysis 
based on cross-country composite indicators, ii) a non-parametric efficiency analysis, and iii) an 
explanation of inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors. Section five concludes. 
 
2. Motivation and related literature 
Economists are concerned about the efficient use of scarce resources. The concept of efficiency 
finds a prominent place in the study of the spending and taxing activities of governments. 
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Economists believe that these activities should generate optimal potential benefits for the 
population and they castigate governments when, in their view, they use public resources 
inefficiently. International organisations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, often express 
concern about governmental activities that they consider inefficient or unproductive. 
 
There are many reasons why a society needs public expenditure (and consequently tax revenue). 
The reasons have been spelled out, over the years, by economists such as Adam Smith, Pigou, 
Musgrave, Samuelson, and others. Public expenditure is needed to deal with (a) genuine public 
goods, (b) significant externalities, (c) the creation of social institutions and (d) the rule of law 
that protect individuals and property. When the focus of public expenditure is on these agreed 
activities, and is carried out in an efficient manner, the public sector remains small and efficient. 
Problems arise when (a) public sector activity is carried out beyond the theoretically justified 
areas; and/or (b) when it is carried out at excessive costs. Of course, the more efficient is the 
working of the market economy, the smaller should be the scope of activities in which there is 
even a theoretical justification for public spending (see Tanzi, 2005). Thus, as market economies 
become more efficient, public spending should fall. 
 
There has been a tendency among economists to measure the output or the benefit in public 
activities on the basis of the budgeted allocation:  the higher the expenditure, the higher the 
benefit. For example calls to allocate a given, or a larger, share of national budgets to health and 
education assume such identity between expenditure and benefits.  The larger the expenditure, the 
greater the benefits received by the intended recipients are assumed to be. But, as argued by 
Tanzi (1974) the two can be widely different. This difference is central to the concept of 
efficiency. 
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Additionally, a relevant issue is the distinction between output and outcome. This distinction 
should be fundamental in the analysis of the efficiency of public spending. There is often much 
attention paid to the outputs of certain activities and too little to the outcomes. For example the 
outputs of educational spending may be school enrolments, or number of students completing a 
grade. The outputs of health expenditure may be the number of operations performed or days 
spent in a hospital bed.  However, the outcomes should be based on how much students learned 
and how many patients got well enough to return to a productive life. 
 
Some recent papers have used non-parametric approaches for measuring relative expenditure 
efficiency across countries, notably Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). This technique, which is 
applied later in this study, was originally developed and applied to firms that convert inputs into 
outputs. The term “firm”, sometimes replaced by the more encompassing term “Decision Making 
Unit” (henceforth DMUs) may include non-profit or public organisations, such as hospitals, 
universities, local authorities, or countries.  
 
Previous research on the performance and efficiency of the public sector and its functions that 
applied non-parametric methods found significant inefficiencies in countries. Studies include 
notably Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) for education and health in Africa, Clements (2002) for 
education in Europe, St. Aubyn (2003) for education spending in the OECD, Afonso, 
Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for public sector performance expenditure in the OECD, Afonso 
and St. Aubyn (2005, 2006) for efficiency in providing health and education in OECD countries. 
De Borger at al. (1994), De Borger and Kerstens (1996), and Afonso and Fernandes (2006) find 
evidence of spending inefficiencies for the local government sector. Most studies apply the DEA 
method while Afonso and St. Aubyn (2006) undertook a two-step DEA/Tobit analysis, in the 
context of a cross-country analysis of secondary education efficiency. 
 
Page 5 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 6
3. Measuring efficiency in public expenditure: methodologies 
3.1. Composite indicators for measuring public sector performance and efficiency 
In recent years various attempts have been made at measuring the efficiency of public 
expenditure via composite indicators. These attempts are of two broad types: macro 
measurements, and micro measurements.  Macro measurements have as their aim an evaluation 
of public spending in its entirety.  In other words they attempt to measure, or rather to get some 
ideas of, the benefits from higher public spending. When, for example, Sweden spends 1 ½ times 
as much in terms of GDP shares as Switzerland, what does it get in return? Micro measurements 
attempt to determine the relationship between spending and benefits in a particular budgetary 
function or even sub-function (i.e. health spending or the efficiency of spending in hospitals, or 
spending for protection against malaria, aids, etc.). 
 
A first macro measurement attempt was made by Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, 2000) in trying to 
assess the benefits from total public spending in eighteen industrialized countries. The approach 
attempts to determine whether larger public spending in these industrialized countries provided 
returns, in terms of some identifiable benefits, that could justify the additional costs (including 
the reduction in individual economic freedom) associated with higher tax burdens. The key 
question that it tries to address is whether there is a positive, identifiable relationship between 
higher public spending and higher social welfare. The application of this method led the authors 
to conclude that additional public expenditure had not been particularly productive in recent 
decades. The group of countries with lower levels of public spending had socio-economic 
indicators that were as good as or at times better than that of the countries with much higher 
spending levels.  
 
Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) built composite indicators of public sector performance. 
They distinguished public sector performance (PSP), defined as the outcome of public policies, 
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from public sector efficiency, defined as the outcome in relation to the resources employed. This 
is also the first method we apply in our country sample analysis later in the paper.  
 
Assume that public sector performance (PSP) depends on the values of certain economic and 
social indicators (I). If there are i countries and j areas of government performance which 
together determine overall performance in country i, PSPi, we can then write 
 ∑
=
=
n
j
iji PSPPSP
1
, (1) 
with )( kij IfPSP = . 
 
Therefore, an improvement in public sector performance depends on an improvement in the 
values of the relevant socio-economic indicators: 
     ∑
=
∆∂
∂=∆
n
ki
k
k
ij II
fPSP .    (2) 
The performance indicators are of two kinds: process or opportunity indicators, and traditional or 
Musgravian indicators. As a first step, they define seven sub-indicators of public performance. 
The first four look at administrative, education, health and public infrastructure outcomes. Each 
of these sub-indicators can contain several elements. For example, “administrative” includes 
indicators for corruption, red tape, quality of judiciary, and the size of the shadow economy. 
These are averaged to give the value for “administrative” performance. Health includes infant 
mortality and life expectancy. A good public administration, a healthy and well-educated 
population, and a sound infrastructure could be considered a prerequisite for a level playing field 
with well-functioning markets and secure property rights, where the rule of law applies, and 
opportunities are plenty and in principle accessible to all. These indicators thereby try to reflect 
the quality of the interaction between fiscal policies and the market process and the influence this 
has on individual opportunities. 
Page 7 of 32
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 8
 
The three other sub-indicators reflect the “Musgravian” tasks for government.1 These try to 
measure the outcomes of the interaction with, and reactions to, the market process by 
government. Income distribution is measured by the first of these indicators. An economic 
stability indicator illustrates the achievement of the stabilisation objective. The third indicator 
tries to assess allocative efficiency by economic performance. Once again each of these 
traditional indicators may be made up of various elements. For example stability is made up of 
variation in output around a trend and inflation. Finally all sub-indicators are used to compute a 
composite public sector performance indicator by giving the sub-indicators equal weights. The 
values are normalized and the average is set equal to one. Then the PSP of each country is related 
to this average and deviations from this average provide an indication of the public sector 
performance of each of country.   
 
However, these performances reflect outcomes without taking into account the level of public 
spending. They ignore the costs in terms of public expenditure. We weigh performance (as 
measured by the PSP indicators) by the amount of relevant public expenditure that is used to 
achieve a given performance level. In order to compute these so-called efficiency indicators, 
public spending was normalised across countries, taking the average value of one for each of the 
six categories specified above. To get some values of public sector efficiency (PSE) the public 
sector performance (PSP) is weighted by the public expenditures as follows: 
 
i
i
i PEX
PSP
PSE = , (3) 
with 
                                                          
1 The conceptual separation between “opportunity” and standard “Musgravian” indicators is of course somewhat 
artificial as, for example, health and education indicators could also be seen as indicators of allocative efficiency. 
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=
=
n
j ij
ij
i
i
PEX
PSP
PEX
PSP
1
. (4) 
The input measures for opportunity indicators are: public consumption as proxy for input to 
produce administrative outcomes; health expenditure for health performance/outcome indicators; 
and education expenditure for education performance. Our earlier study also included a measure 
of the outcome of public investment, but due to a lack of comparable data, this measure is not 
used in this study. 
 
Inputs for the standard or “Musgravian indicators” are: transfers and subsidies as proxies for 
input to affect the income distribution; total spending as proxy for the input to affect economic 
stabilization (given that larger public sectors are claimed to make economies more stable);2 and 
total spending also as a proxy input for economic efficiency and the distortions of taxation needed 
to finance total expenditure. 
 
However, there are some caveats: it is not easy to accurately identify the effects of public sector 
spending on outcomes and separate the impact of public spending from other influences. 
Moreover, comparing expenditure ratios across countries implicitly assumes that production costs 
for public services are proportionate to GDP per capita.3  
 
3.2. Non-parametric analysis of performance and efficiency 
The DEA methodology, originating from Farrell’s (1957) seminal work and popularised by 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), assumes the existence of a convex production frontier. The 
production frontier in the DEA approach is constructed using linear programming methods.4 
                                                          
2 For a differing view on the limits of the stabilising effect of growing government, see Cuaresma, Reitschuler and 
Sillgoner (2005) and Buti and van den Noord (2003). 
3 See Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005) for a discussion of the several caveats of such approach. 
4 Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) offer introductions to DEA, while Simar and Wilson (2003) and 
Murillo-Zamorano (2004) are good references for an overview of frontier techniques. 
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Regarding public sector efficiency, the general relationship that we expect to test can be given by 
the following function for each country i: 
 )( ii XfY = , i=1,…,n  (5) 
where we have Yi – a composite indicator reflecting our output measure (the PSP indicator in our 
case); Xi – spending or other relevant inputs in country i (government spending will be used 
ahead). If )( ii xfY < , it is said that country i exhibits inefficiency. For the observed input level, 
the actual output is smaller than the best attainable one and inefficiency can then be measured by 
computing the distance to the theoretical efficiency frontier.  
 
The analytical description of the linear programming problem, in the variable-returns to scale 
hypothesis, is sketched below for an input-oriented specification. Suppose there are k inputs and 
m outputs for n DMUs. For the i-th DMU, yi is the column vector of the outputs and xi is the 
column vector of the intputs. We can also define X as the (k×n) input matrix and Y as the (m×n) 
output matrix. The DEA model is then specified with the following mathematical programming 
problem, for a given i-th DMU, and to be solved for each DMU:5 
 
, 
s. to   0
         0
1' 1        
 0
i
i
Min
y Y
x X
n
δ λδ
λ
δ λ
λ
λ
− + ≥
− ≥
=
≥
 . (6) 
In problem (6), δ is a scalar (that satisfies δ≤ 1), more specifically it is the efficiency score that 
measures technical efficiency. With δ<1, the country is inside the frontier (i.e. it is inefficient), 
while δ=1 implies that the country is on the frontier (i.e. it is efficient). 
 
                                                          
5 We present here the equivalent envelopment form, derived by Charnes et al. (1978), using the duality property of 
the multiplier form of the original programming model. 
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The vector λ is a (n×1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to compute the 
location of an inefficient DMU if it were to become efficient. The inefficient DMU would be 
projected on the production frontier as a linear combination of those weights, related to the peers 
of the inefficient DMU. 1n  is a n-dimensional vector of ones. The restriction 1'1 =λn  imposes 
convexity of the frontier, accounting for variable returns to scale. Dropping this restriction would 
amount to admit that returns to scale were constant.  
 
3.3. Using non-discretionary factors to explain inefficiencies 
The analysis via composite performance indicators and DEA analysis have assumed tacitly that 
expenditure efficiency is purely the result of discretionary (policy and spending) inputs. They do 
not take into account the presence of “environmental” factors, also known as non-discretionary or 
“exogenous” inputs. However, such factors may play a relevant role in determining heterogeneity 
across countries and influence performance and efficiency. Exogenous or non-discretionary 
factors can have an economic and non-economic origin.  
 
As non-discretionary and discretionary factors jointly contribute to country performance and 
efficiency, there are in the literature several proposals on how to deal with this issue, implying 
usually the use of two-stage and even three-stage models.6 Using the DEA output efficiency 
scores, we will evaluate the importance of non-discretionary factors below in the context of our 
new member and emerging market sample. We will undertake Tobit regressions by regressing the 
output efficiency scores, δι, on a set of possible non-discretionary inputs, Z, as as follows 
 iii Zf εδ += )( .  (7) 
 
                                                          
6 See Ruggiero (2004) and Simar and Wilson (2004) for an overview. 
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4. A quantitive assessment of public sector performance and expenditure efficiency 
4.1. Some stylised facts for the EU new member states and comparative countries 
Our country sample includes the ten EU new member states as from 2004 (Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia); 
the two EU new member states as from 2007 (Bulgaria, and Romania); three “old” member 
countries that underwent a catching up process after entering the EU, (Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal); and finally nine countries that can also be considered as emerging markets, (Brazil, 
Chile, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey). This country 
selection was determined by the search for a sufficient number of countries which can be 
compared with the new EU members and for which reasonably good quality data is available so 
that an expenditure efficiency analysis becomes meaningful. In addition, we will make occasional 
references to comparative indicators for OECD or EU countries and country averages. 
 
Table 1 illustrates total expenditure and the public expenditure composition across the sample 
countries, on an average basis for the period 1999-2003 (or within this period according to data 
availability). First, it is striking that the new EU member countries on average report similar total 
spending as the “old” EU members and much higher spending than most other emerging markets. 
When looking for relatively small governments with spending ratios of less than 40% of GDP, we 
only find the Baltic countries belonging to this group. Second, the divergence in expenditure ratios is 
enormous ranging from about 18% to 50% of GDP. The Baltics’ relatively low spending ratio is 
about one quarter less than that of the central European countries but it is significantly higher than 
the average for the Asian emerging economies (Korea, Singapore, and Thailand).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
When looking at the expenditure composition, there are further major differences. But these 
differences are much more pronounced for less productive spending categories. Small government 
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countries tend to spend equally as much, or even significantly more, on productive spending such as 
investment and education as the rest of the sample countries. New members report public 
consumption around 20% of GDP, twice as much as Asian emerging economies, with the reverse 
relation holding for public investment where new members spend roughly 3% of GDP while the 
Asian countries report an average above 6% of GDP. Data on transfers and subsidies are sketchier 
but huge differences are noteworthy: large welfare states of similar size as in the old EU members 
predominate in many of the new member countries (with the Baltics’ featuring somewhat lower 
expenditure) while such spending in Asian emerging economies is only fractional. When looking at 
education, differences across country groups are much smaller than for total spending. New 
members, old EU members and other emerging markets are not far apart from each other. In health, 
differences are again very significant where central European countries spend almost two and half 
times as much in % of GDP as the Asian emerging economies. 
 
4.2. Public sector performance and efficiency via composite indicators 
4.2.1. Public sector performance (PSP) 
As regards public sector performance we have deviated in a few respects from our earlier study. 
In the absence of reasonable data on public infrastructure we in particular focus on three 
opportunity indicators and the three respective Musgravian indicators (Annex Tables provide 
primary data).7  
 
We compile performance indicators from the various indices giving an equal weight to each of 
them and the results are reported in Table 2.8 The results for public sector performance show 
                                                          
7 The choice of indicators is slightly different from that used in Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi (2005). In addtion to 
omitting public infrastructure, education is reflected only by a qualitative measure of education achievement (leaving 
out secondary school enrolment) and economic performance excludes the level of per-capita GDP (which in this 
sample would strongly bias in favour of the rich countries). 
8 The relevant time period for the several sub-indicators varies a little according to the availability of data but is 
essentially reported to 2001/2003 with some variables being used as an average of longer time spans (see the Annex 
for the precise periods). 
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some interesting patterns, with an overall very diverse picture for the new EU member states. 
Starting with the overall PSP indicator, the best performers seem to be Singapore, Cyprus and 
Ireland. Other Asian emerging economies and Malta follow this group of top performers while 
most new EU member countries and Portugal and Greece post a broadly average performance. 
Brazil, Bulgaria and Turkey are placed at the bottom end. The size of government per se appears 
to be a too crude instrument of differentiation, when looking at the score for large public sector 
countries. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
When comparing the results for the best performers in this study with those from our earlier study 
on industrialised OECD countries, it is noteworthy that Ireland was “only” an average performer. 
Portugal and Greece, which are near average in this group, were amongst the weakest in the 
former study. The results hence show that public sector performance is on average still somewhat 
lower in most new EU member countries and emerging markets than in the “old” industrialised 
countries but a few of them (notably the new member island countries and Asian Emerging 
economies) have broadly caught up. 
 
With regard to sub-indicators, it is interesting to see that the relatively strong performance of the 
new EU member states on human capital/education and income distribution contrasts with a 
relatively weak one for economic performance and stability. There is no clear pattern of 
distinction between Baltics and Central European countries while the two island countries post 
strong values for all indicators for which data is available. Asian Emerging economies performed 
very strongly on administration, human capital and economic stability and growth. Overall 
performance was very equal as regards health indicators.  
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4.2.2. Public sector efficiency (PSE) 
Public sector performance must be set in relation to the inputs used in order to gauge the 
efficiency of the state. We compute indicators of Public Sector Efficiency (PSE), taking into 
account the expenditure related to each sub-indicator as described in section three. PSE indicators 
are presented in Table 3 where, due to data limitations for the pre-1998 period in many countries, 
averages of the corresponding expenditure item were used for the relatively short period of 1998-
2003 (see Annex for precise dates and primary data). 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
The results for measuring public sector efficiency show an accentuation of the findings for public 
sector performance. This suggests that more public spending often has relatively low returns as 
regards improved performance (which is consistent with the findings of our earlier study for 
industrialised countries). Most low performers, including most new EU member states range 
between 0.8 and 0.9 and Cyprus is the only new member country with an average PSE score. 
Countries with a small government sector post a higher PSE score than the average (and hence 
even more so than the countries with “big” governments). The emerging countries of Asia plus 
Mauritius have most of the highest scores as their good performance is achieved with low public 
spending. 
 
When looking at sub-indices, the new member states efficiency scores are near average on human 
capital and on income distribution. In all other areas, PSE scores are well below average for the 
new EU member states. Note also that the income distribution efficiency score is highest in the 
countries with smaller welfare states. This confirms findings elsewhere that welfare programmes 
in (rich and) poor countries are often poorly targeted and benefit those with special interests 
rather than those in need (Alesina (1998) and Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005)). 
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All in all the results suggest that efficiency differs enormously across countries. In the new 
member states, a relatively average performance (PSP scores) in most countries is “bought” with 
too many inputs so that efficiency (PSE) is low. In the next section, we will analyse whether these 
findings are confirmed by using a DEA approach. 
 
4.3. Relative efficiency analysis via a DEA approach 
We used a DEA approach as described above, using as our output measure the PSP composite 
indicator reported in Table 2 and as an input measure, the total government spending as a ratio of 
GDP. Table 4 presents both the input and the output oriented efficiency coefficients of the 
variable returns to scale analysis while the constant returns to scale coefficients are also reported 
for completeness. We opted for not including Singapore since its economic indicators give it 
characteristics of an outlier in the country sample we use.9 
 [Insert Table 4] 
 
The results largely confirm the findings of the earlier “macro” approach of determining efficiency 
of the public sector. New member states are ranked between 9 and 23 on input scores and 
between 6 and 21 on output scores, hence reflecting rather diverse and often below average 
efficiency. Two countries that also had amongst the top PSE scores are located on the frontier: 
Cyprus and Thailand, while Ireland, Korea, Chile and Mauritius come next. From an input 
oriented perspective, Brazil, Greece and Hungary find themselves at the bottom of the list while 
most new member states fill the middle ranks. The highest-ranking country uses 1/3 of the input 
that the bottom ranking one uses to attain a certain PSP score. The average input score of 0.59 
hints to the possibility that, for the level of output they are attaining, countries could in theory use 
around 41 per cent less resources. 
                                                          
9 Similar overall results are obtained with Singapore, as shown in Afonso et al. (2006). 
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From an output perspective, the top performer achieves twice as much output as the least efficient 
country with the same input. The average output score of 0.78 implies that on average, for the 
level of input they are using, the countries are only obtaining around 78 percent of the output they 
should deliver if they were deemed efficient.10 Figure 1 illustrates the production possibility 
frontier associated with the aforementioned set of DEA results. 
 [Insert Figure 1] 
 
4.4. Explaining inefficiencies via non-discretionary factors 
As an additional step, we extend our analysis to exogenous factors that explain expenditure 
efficiency (see section three for methodical issues). It is probably reasonable to conjecture that 
expenditure efficiency depends on the “technology” applied in the public sector, on factors that 
influence the ability of private agents to protect their resources from public claims, on the 
monitoring capacities of public and private agents, and on international constraint. The variables 
and underlying hypotheses we test are the following:  
 
i) Secondary school enrolment. This variable aims to proxy the level of education of the 
population in a given country. More educated people are hypothesized to be better able to 
monitor the activities of politicians and bureaucrats and ultimately sanction crass inefficiency. 
But more education is also likely to imply better educated and trained (and hence more efficient) 
civil servants.  
ii) The competence of the civil servants (survey results presented in the Global Competitiveness 
Report, see Annex for sources and explanations). This variable aims to measure greater 
                                                          
10 Such calculations are an approximation of potential direct costs of inefficiency. However, indirect costs, implying 
a higher loss for consumer welfare should also be taken into account. This is outside the scope of our paper, but 
Afonso and Gaspar (2007) address this issue. 
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productivity and efficiency in the public sector through better training etc. It is expected to be 
correlated with the education variable. 
iii) Per capita GDP. This variable aims to proxy the physical capital stock which facilitates an 
efficient production of public goods and services but which may also facilitate monitoring of 
policy makers.  
iv) An indicator of property rights. Secure property rights make it more difficult for governments 
to extract wealth/rents from the private sector. They also facilitate holding governments 
accountable for their actions.  
v) Trade openness (exports and imports as a share of GDP). This indicator proxies the degree of 
international competition over labour and capital that would penalise public inefficiency 
disproportionately.  
vi) Transparency in public policy. This is another indicator that should measure the ease of 
monitoring public officials.  
vii) Other more direct indicators of political accountability (such as civil liberty, political rights or 
checks and balances) do not show much variation for this country group as almost all of them are 
in the top group. 
 
Exogenous factors could also include other factors that could be detrimental or favourable to 
efficiency (such as the climate, the cultural background) for which economically meaningful 
hypotheses are less readily available. We do not include such variables in our analysis. 
 
Using the DEA output efficiency scores computed in the previous subsection, we now evaluate 
the importance of non-discretionary inputs via censored Tobit regressions where output efficiency 
scores are regressed on our choice of exogenous, non-discretionary factors. Table 5 confirms the 
relevance of several of our hypotheses and the variables chosen to test them.  
[Insert Table 5] 
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The Tobit analysis suggests that the security of property rights, per capita GDP, the competence 
of civil servants, and the education level of people positively affect expenditure efficiency. Due 
to significant correlation, however, the two competence/education variables are only significant 
in separate regressions while the other two variables are robust over all specifications. 
International trade openness, trust in politicians and transparency of the political system have not 
been found to display a significant influence on expenditure efficiency (even though only the 
coefficient for public trust in politicians had the wrong sign). The regressions’ standard deviation 
also points to a reasonable model fit. 
 
In Table 6 we report output efficiency score corrections from model 1 in Table 5 for the 
environmental variables detected as statistically significant in the Tobit analysis: GDP, property 
rights, competence of civil servants. We computed these corrections by considering that the non-
discretionary factors varied to the sample average in each country. The output scores corrected 
for environmental effects (truncated to one when necessary) are presented in column five of 
Table 6 as a result of the sum of the previous four columns. One should also notice that the 
number of countries considered decreased from twenty-three in the DEA calculations to twenty in 
the two-step analysis, since property rights, and competence of public civil servants data was not 
available for Cyprus, Malta, and Thailand.11 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
Comparing the corrected scores in Table 6, resulting from corrections for environmental variables 
with the scores from the standard DEA analysis, we can observe some changes. Some countries 
                                                          
11 We did a similar correction exercise for model 2, where secondary school enrolment is statistically significant, but 
since the results were not very diferent, this is not reported, being worthwhile noticing that such factor has a positive 
contribution to the efficiency score of most new EU member states. 
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decreased their respective distances to the production possibility frontier, for instance this is the 
case of Hungary, Slovenia, Mauritius and South Africa. In the case of these two last countries, for 
such improvement contributed positively the above average positioning in terms of property 
rights, which compensate the negative impact from GDP and competence of civil servants 
variables. On the other hand, other countries see a decline in their efficiency scores after taking 
into account the non-discretionary factors. For instance, the aforementioned three factors all 
contribute negatively to distance away from the frontier Mexico, Romania, and Turkey. 
 
When we compare the results of our composite indicator analysis of performance and efficiency 
with those of the standard DEA analysis, and the two-step analysis, we notice rather similar 
results as reflected in very high correlation coefficients for scores and ranks across methods (see 
Table 7). This is evidence for a certain robustness of our results. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we analysed public sector efficiency in the new member states of the European 
Union as compared to emerging markets. We start with a conceptual discussion of expenditure 
efficiency measurement issues where challenges regarding the measurement of costs, the 
definition of goals and the measurement of outcomes are significant. Taking these challenges into 
account, we calculate efficiency scores and rankings by applying a range of measurement 
techniques to the new EU member countries and a selection of emerging markets, catch-up 
economies, and EU candidate countries.  
 
The results of our analysis show that expenditure efficiency across new EU member states is 
rather diverse, especially compared to the group of top performing emerging markets in Asia. 
From the analysis of composite public sector performance (PSP) and efficiency (PSE) scores we 
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find that countries with lean public sectors and public expenditure ratios not far from 30% of 
GDP tend to be most efficient. PSE scores of the most efficient countries are more than twice as 
high as those of the poorest performers. 
 
From the DEA results we see that a small set of countries define or are very close to the 
theoretical production possibility frontier: Thailand, Cyprus, Korea, and Ireland. From an input 
perspective the highest ranking country uses 1/3 of the input  that the bottom ranking one uses to 
attain a certain PSP score. The average input scores suggest that countries could use around 45 
per cent less resources to attain the same outcomes if they were fully efficient. Average output 
scores suggest that countries are only delivering around 2/3 of the output they could deliver if 
they were on the efficiency frontier. 
 
Finally we examine via Tobit analysis the influence of non-discretionary factors, notably non-
fiscal variables, on expenditure efficiency. The study shows that per-capita income, public sector 
competence and education levels as well as the security of property rights seem to facilitate the 
prevention of inefficiencies in the public sector. Additionally, we corrected output scores by 
considering the effects of non-discretionary factors. The country rankings and output scores 
resulting from such correction, even if not considerably different from the DEA results, allow 
decomposing the specific non-discretionary factor contribution to the change in the efficiency 
scores.  
 
From a policy perspective, one should be careful to draw overly strong conclusions and we have 
referred to a number of caveats in the course of the paper. Nevertheless, it is apparent that many 
new members states and other emerging markets can still considerably increase the efficiency of 
public spending by improving the outcomes and by restraining the resource use. The final 
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econometric analysis also suggests that high education levels, a competent civil service and the 
security of property rights seem to provide an “extra boost” to public expenditure efficiency. 
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Annex – Data and sources 
 
Annex Table A – Primary data for performance sub-indicators 
 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ 9/ 10/ 11/ 12/ 13/ 14/ 
Brazil 4.6 2.8 3.9 4.6 3.3 68.3 31.0 60.7 1.41 220.9 2.6 7.6 7360 71.3
Bulgaria 5.5 2.5 2.7 5.2 5.0 71.7 14.0 26.4 0.14 139.0 0.7 14.6 6890 87.6
Chile 6.3 3.1 4.6 2.4 3.6 75.8 10.0 56.7 1.43 5.5 4.6 7.9 9190 74.5
Cyprus      78.0 5.0  2.31 3.0 4.0 3.2 21190 88.3
Czech Republic 5.2 2.7 4.2 2.6 5.5 74.9 4.0 25.4 0.97 6.0 2.1 7.0 14720 87.1
Estonia 5.9 4.2 5.3 2.1 5.5 70.6 11.0 37.6 1.26 13.7 4.3 10.6 10170 82.8
Greece 4.8 2.4 4.7 3.5 4.6 78.0 5.0 32.7 3.91 5.4 3.3 10.3 17440 87.4
Hungary 5.8 2.7 4.9 2.3 5.7 71.5 8.0 24.4 2.64 14.2 3.5 7.8 12340 87.2
Ireland 6.0 3.4 5.2 2.3 5.3 76.6 6.0 35.9 2.53 3.1 7.9 7.8 32410 85.8
Korea 5.3 3.2 4.1 2.8 4.7 73.6 5.0 31.6 1.08 4.1 5.4 3.7 15090 90.9
Latvia 4.9 3.7 4.2 3.6 4.8 70.4 17.0 32.4 1.66 10.4 4.7 12.9 7730 74.4
Lithuania 5.5 2.8 3.3 2.4 5.2 72.7 8.0 32.4 0.63 15.4 3.4 8.4 8470 88.6
Malta 6.1 2.9 5.3 3.0 4.9 78.2 5.0  1.47 2.7 3.8 5.2 13160 79.2
Mauritius 4.6 2.2 4.4 3.3 4.2 72.1 17.0  3.26 6.3 4.8 7.3 9860 64.2
Mexico 5.0 2.3 3.3 5.0 3.1 73.4 24.0 53.1 0.70 15.5 2.7 3.1 8430 59.7
Poland 4.8 2.8 3.9 3.7 4.7 73.5 8.0 31.6 2.10 13.2 4.3 13.7 9450 90.9
Portugal 5.8 2.8 5.7 3.0 3.2 75.8 5.0 38.5 1.53 3.3 2.6 5.7 18150 85.2
Romania 3.6 2.0 2.4 5.5 5.9 69.9 19.0 31.1 0.46 58.5 2.1 9.3 5830 79.6
Singapore 6.7 5.1 5.2 1.4 6.5 78.4 3.0 42.5 1.06 1.1 5.1 3.2 22680 74.3
Slovak Republic 5.2 2.2 3.2 1.6 5.6 73.2 8.0 19.5 2.58 8.4 4.2 15.7 11960 74.9
Slovenia 5.8 2.8 4.3 2.0 5.3 75.6 4.0 28.4 3.61 9.7 4.1 7.3 17130 88.6
South Africa 4.9 2.9 5.6 4.5 2.8 47.1 56.0 59.3 2.90 7.3 2.8 25.3 11290 57.2
Thailand 5.1 3.2 4.8 3.7 4.5 69.0 24.0 41.4 0.58 3.6 3.4 3.0 6400 79.8
Turkey 4.1 2.5 3.7 5.7 4.0 69.8 36.0 41.5 0.46 69.8 2.8 7.2 5890 51.3
Average 5.3 2.9 4.3 3.3 4.7 72.4 13.9 37.3 1.7 26.7 3.7 8.7 12635 78.8
 
1/ Corruption index (1 to 7).  
2/ Red tape (burden of regulation) index (1 to 7, good).  
3/ Quality of judiciary index (1 to 7, good). 
4/ Shadow economy index (1 to 9, bad). We used the following transformation 9-I, where I is the shadow 
economy index. 
5/ Quality of math and science education index. 
6/ Life expectancy at birth, years, 2001.  
7/ Infant mortality rate (IMR), 2001. We used the infant survival rate, ISR=(1000-IMR)/1000. 
8/ Gini coefficient, 2003 or latest year. We used the construction 100-Gini. 
9/ Coefficient of variation (inverse) of average real GDP growth for 1994-2003. 
10/ Average inflation, 1994-2003. We used its inverse. 
11/ Average GDP real growth rate, 1994-2003. 
12/ Average unemployment, 1994-2003. 
13/ Per capita GDP, PPP USD, 2001. 
14/ Secondary school enrolment ratio, 2001 or latest. 
 
Sources: 
1/, 2/, 3/, 4/, 5/ - Global Competitiveness Report, 2003/2004 edition. 
6/, 7/, 13/, 14/ - World Bank, WDI 2003. 
8/ - World Bank, World Development Report, 2003 edition. 
9/, 10/, 11/, 12/ - IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database). 
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Annex Table B – Primary data for the non-discretionary factors 
 
 
GDP per 
capita 
1/ 
 
Property 
rights 
2/ 
 
Competence 
of public 
officials 
3/ 
Secondary 
school 
enrolment 
4/ 
Degree of 
openness 
5/ 
 
Public trust 
of 
politicians 
6/ 
Transparency 
7/ 
 
 
Brazil 7360 5.0 2.4 71.3 29.15 2.2 4.51 
Bulgaria 6890 3.2 3.3 87.6 116.20 2.3  
Chile 9190 5.6 2.1 74.5 69.15 2.9 6.64 
Cyprus 21190   88.3 95.53   
Czech Republic 14720 4.4 2.3 87.1 126.64 1.9 3.60 
Estonia 10170 4.8 3.0 82.8 156.22 2.8 5.96 
Greece 17440 5.0 1.8 87.4 48.59 2.5 3.45 
Hungary 12340 5.3 2.8 87.2 131.49 2.6 3.50 
Ireland 32410 6.1 3.6 85.8 151.31 3.2 5.47 
Korea 15090 4.7 3.0 90.9 73.51 2.1 4.21 
Latvia 7730 4.3 3.1 74.4 97.51 2.3  
Lithuania 8470 4.2 3.4 88.6 109.46 1.9  
Malta 13160   79.2 163.55   
Mauritius 9860 5.4 2.6 64.2 115.24 2.6  
Mexico 8430 4.6 2.6 59.7 57.30 2.5 4.53 
Poland 9450 4.6 2.7 90.9 71.28 2.4 2.21 
Portugal 18150 5.3 2.2 85.2 66.59 3.2 5.09 
Romania 5830 4.5 2.6 79.6 80.38 3.1 3.23 
Slovak Republic 11960 5.2 2.0 74.9 156.87 2.8 4.28 
Slovenia 17130 4.8 3.4 88.6 112.97 3.0 3.70 
South Africa 11290 5.3 1.9 57.2 53.69 2.9 6.05 
Thailand 6400  2.6 79.8 124.31 2.8 5.66 
Turkey 5890 4.2 2.1 51.3 58.05 1.9 4.43 
 
1/ GDP per capita PPP, 2001, USD.  
2/ Financial assets and wealth are (1=poorly delineated and not protected by law, 7=clearly delineated and 
protected by law), 2001-02.  
3/ The competence of personnel in the public sector is (1=lower than the private sector, 7=higher than the 
private sector). 
4/ Secondary school enrolment, 2001 or latest. 
5/ Degree of openness = (Imports+Exports)/GDP, 2003. 
6/ Public trust in the honesty of politicians is (1=very low, 7=very high) 
7/ Transparency, highest is best, 2003 data. 
 
Sources:  
1/, 4/ - World Bank, WDI 2003. 
2/, 3/, 6/ - World Economic Forum: Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002. 
5/ - IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO database). 
7/ - IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2004. 
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Figure 1 – Production possibility frontier: one input, one output 
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BGR – Bulgaria; BRA – Brazil; CHL – Chile; CYP – Cyprus; CZE – Czech Republic; EST – Estonia; GRC – 
Greece; HUN – Hungary; IRL – Ireland; KOR – Korea; LTU – Lithuania; LVA – Latvia; MEX – Mexico; 
MLT – Malta; MUS – Mauritius; POL – Poland; PRT – Portugal; ROM – Romania; SVK - Slovak Republic; 
SVN – Slovenia; THA – Thailand; TUR – Turkey; ZAF – South Africa.  
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Table 1 – Public expenditure in sample countries and country groups, % of GDP 
 
 
Total 
spending 
1/ 
Government 
consumption 
2/ 
Transfers 
and 
subsidies 
3/ 
Interest 
payments 
4/ 
Public 
investment 
5/ 
Education 
 
6/ 
Health 
 
7/ 
Brazil 46.6 19.5 17.1 8.2 1.9 4.6 3.3 
Bulgaria 38.6 17.3 15.2 3.2 3.4 3.4 4.0 
Chile 24.4 12.6 7.9 1.2 2.7 3.8 2.4 
Cyprus 40.0 18.0 11.0 3.3 3.0 5.6 2.5 
Czech Republic 40.6 22.7 15.0 1.2 3.4 4.0 6.2 
Estonia 36.4 19.7 10.7 0.3 4.1 6.2 4.4 
Greece 48.6 16.8 17.0 7.2 3.8 3.7 5.1 
Hungary 50.2 22.4 15.0 4.6 3.8 4.8 5.3 
Ireland 33.0 14.8 9.3 1.7 3.8 4.4 4.9 
Korea 24.4 12.7   5.4 3.8 2.4 
Latvia 36.6 21.4 12.7 0.9 1.3 5.8 3.5 
Lithuania 33.3 20.3 11.1 1.5 2.6 5.9 4.5 
Malta 45.0 20.7 14.5 3.8 4.4 4.8 6.2 
Mauritius 24.7 12.9  3.8 7.5 3.8 2.1 
Mexico 25.3 11.7 5.2 4.6 3.8 4.6 2.6 
Poland 43.2 17.9 17.9 2.8 3.3 5.1 4.2 
Portugal 46.2 20.7 14.3 3.1 3.7 5.7 6.2 
Romania 33.7 15.7 13.7 2.3 1.9 3.4 3.8 
Singapore 21.0 11.4 8.7 0.8   1.4 
Slovak Republic 43.8 20.0 14.2 3.5 2.9 4.1 5.2 
Slovenia 42.1 20.2 18.6 2.3 2.9  6.0 
South Africa 26.3 18.4  4.5 2.7 5.7 3.6 
Thailand 17.8 11.2   7.7 5.3 2.3 
Turkey 42.7 13.8  21.3 4.6 3.5 4.0 
Average 36.0 17.2 13.1 3.9 3.7 4.6 4.0 
Max 50.2 22.7 18.6 21.3 7.7 6.2 6.2 
Min 17.8 11.2 5.2 0.3 1.3 3.4 1.4 
New EU members 41.1 20.3 14.1 2.4 3.2 5.2 4.8 
Baltic countries 35.4 20.5 11.5 0.9 2.7 6.0 4.1 
Other new EU 43.5 20.3 15.2 3.1 3.4 4.7 5.1 
Asian NIC 21.0 11.8 8.7 0.8 6.6 4.6 2.0 
Other NIC 32.8 15.2 11.8 6.1 3.5 4.1 3.2 
OECD 1990s 8/ 46.5 19.8 15.1  3.0 5.4 6.2 
 
1/, 2/, 3/, 4/, 5/ - Average for 1999-2003, source: IMF World Economic Outlook, and European Commission 
AMECO database.  
6/ Average for 1998-2001, source: World Bank, WDI 2003. 
7/ Average for 1998-2002, source: World Bank, WDI 2003. 
8/ Source: Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) for OECD 1990s. 
Note: columns 2 through 5 report economic expenditure categories, and that the last two columns report functional 
expenditure categories. 
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Table 2 – Public Sector Performance (PSP) indicators (2001/2003) 
Opportunity 
Indicators  
“Musgravian” 
Indicators 
 
Country 
Adminis-
tration 
Human 
capital 
Health Distribu-
tion 
Stability Economic 
perform. 
Total public 
sector 
performance
(equal 
weights 1/) 
Brazil 0.88 0.80 0.96 0.63 0.43 0.77 0.75 
Bulgaria 0.80 1.09 0.99 1.17 0.06 0.31 0.74 
Chile 1.12 0.86 1.03 0.69 0.92 1.02 0.94 
Cyprus  1.12 1.04  1.59 1.54 1.33 
Czech Republic 1.00 1.14 1.02 1.19 0.74 0.74 0.97 
Estonia 1.25 1.11 0.99 1.00 0.57 0.88 0.97 
Greece 0.95 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.67 0.76 1.09 
Hungary 1.09 1.16 1.00 1.21 0.97 0.88 1.05 
Ireland 1.17 1.11 1.03 1.02 1.64 1.47 1.24 
Korea 1.04 1.08 1.01 1.09 1.00 1.60 1.14 
Latvia 1.03 0.98 0.98 1.08 0.76 0.88 0.95 
Lithuania 0.98 1.12 1.00 1.08 0.37 0.84 0.90 
Malta 1.11 1.03 1.04  1.45 1.12 1.15 
Mauritius 0.91 0.86 1.00  1.40 1.08 1.05 
Mexico 0.80 0.71 1.00 0.75 0.38 1.41 0.84 
Poland 0.92 1.08 1.01 1.09 0.83 0.81 0.96 
Portugal 1.11 0.88 1.03 0.98 1.30 0.91 1.04 
Romania 0.63 1.13 0.98 1.10 0.18 0.63 0.78 
Singapore 1.39 1.16 1.05 0.92 2.94 1.71 1.53 
Slovak Republic 0.95 1.07 1.01 1.28 1.09 0.77 1.03 
Slovenia 1.07 1.13 1.03 1.14 1.35 0.99 1.12 
South Africa 1.00 0.66 0.80 0.65 1.23 0.50 0.81 
Thailand 1.03 0.99 0.97 0.93 0.94 1.54 1.07 
Turkey 0.77 0.75 0.97 0.93 0.17 0.82 0.74 
Average 2/ 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Max 1.39 1.16 1.05 1.28 2.94 1.71 1.53 
Min 0.63 0.66 0.80 0.63 0.06 0.31 0.74 
New EU countries 0.99 1.06 1.00 1.09 0.74 0.86 0.96 
Baltics 1.06 1.10 1.02 1.14 0.93 0.95 1.03 
Other new EU 0.95 1.05 1.00 1.08 0.66 0.82 0.93 
Asian NIC 1.11 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.76 1.44 1.21 
Other NIC 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.87 0.96 1.08 0.98 
1/ Each sub-indicator contributes 1/6 to total indicator. 2/ Simple averages. 
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Table 3 – Public sector efficiency (PSE) indicators (2001/2003) 1/ 
Opportunity 
Indicators  
“Musgravian” 
Indicators 
 
Country 
Adminis-
tration 
Human 
capital 
Health Distribution 
 
Stability Economic 
perform. 
Total public 
sector 
efficiency 
(equal 
weights 2/) 
Brazil 0.78 0.81 1.15 0.48 0.33 0.59 0.69 
Bulgaria 0.79 1.49 1.00 1.01 0.06 0.29 0.77 
Chile 1.53 1.04 1.70 1.15 1.37 1.51 1.38 
Cyprus  0.92 1.66  1.44 1.39 1.08 
Czech Republic 0.76 1.31 0.66 1.04 0.66 0.66 0.85 
Estonia 1.09 0.83 0.91 1.21 0.57 0.87 0.91 
Greece 0.97 1.32 0.83 0.83 1.23 0.56 0.96 
Hungary 0.83 1.12 0.75 1.05 0.70 0.63 0.85 
Ireland 1.36 1.18 0.84 1.44 1.79 1.61 1.37 
Korea 1.40 1.31 1.72  1.47 2.36 1.65 
Latvia 0.82 0.79 1.14 1.11 0.75 0.87 0.91 
Lithuania 0.83 0.88 0.90 1.27 0.40 0.90 0.86 
Malta 0.92 0.99 0.68  1.16 0.90 0.78 
Mauritius 1.21 1.04 1.91  2.04 1.58 1.56 
Mexico 1.18 0.72 1.52 1.90 0.55 2.01 1.31 
Poland 0.89 0.98 0.97 0.80 0.69 0.68 0.83 
Portugal 0.92 0.71 0.66 0.90 1.01 0.71 0.82 
Romania 0.69 1.53 1.03 1.05 0.20 0.68 0.86 
Singapore 2.09  2.90 1.38 5.05 2.94 2.39 
Slovak Republic 0.82 1.23 0.77 1.18 0.90 0.64 0.92 
Slovenia 0.91  0.68 0.81 1.15 0.84 0.88 
South Africa 0.93 0.54 0.89  1.69 0.68 0.95 
Thailand 1.58 0.86 1.68  1.91 3.11 1.83 
Turkey 0.96 0.99 0.98  0.15 0.69 0.63 
Average 3/ 1.06 1.03 1.16 1.03 1.14 1.15 1.09 
Max 2.09 1.53 2.90 1.90 5.05 3.11 2.39 
Min 0.69 0.54 0.66 0.48 0.06 0.29 0.63 
New EU countries 0.87 1.05 0.87 1.04 0.64 0.77 0.84 
Baltics 0.86 1.00 0.78 1.16 0.75 0.81 0.83 
Other new EU 0.88 1.07 0.91 1.00 0.59 0.76 0.84 
Asian NIC 1.63 0.95 2.16 1.38 3.00 2.54 1.93 
Other NIC 1.10 0.95 1.32 0.96 1.11 1.29 1.13 
 
1/ These indicators are the expenditure weighted “counterparts” of the indicators of Table 1. 
2/ Each sub-indicator contributes equally to the total indicator. 
3/ Simple averages. 
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Table 4 – DEA results: one input, one output 
Input oriented Output oriented Country 
VRS TE Rank VRS TE Rank 
Brazil 0.381 22 0.562 22 
Bulgaria 0.461 15 0.564 21 
Chile 0.730 5 0.823 8 
Cyprus 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Czech Republic 0.439 16 0.735 15 
Estonia 0.489 13 0.753 13 
Greece 0.407 19 0.822 9 
Hungary 0.355 23 0.792 10 
Ireland 0.997 3 0.999 3 
Korea 0.976 4 0.994 4 
Latvia 0.486 14 0.742 14 
Lithuania 0.535 10 0.720 18 
Malta 0.555 9 0.868 6 
Mauritius 0.721 6 0.914 5 
Mexico 0.703 7 0.730 16 
Poland 0.412 18 0.723 17 
Portugal 0.385 21 0.782 11 
Romania 0.528 11 0.621 20 
Slovak Republic 0.406 20 0.777 12 
Slovenia 0.526 12 0.843 7 
South Africa 0.676 8 0.693 19 
Thailand 1.000 1 1.000 1 
Turkey 0.416 17 0.555 23 
Average 0.591  0.783  
     
     
 
  
 VRS TE – variable returns to scale technical efficiency. 
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Table 5 – Censored normal Tobit results 
(dependent variable: output efficiency scores from Table 4) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Per-capita GDP 7.08E-06 *** 
(2.18) 
6.68E-06 ** 
(2.01) 
6.75E-06 ** 
(2.04) 
7.08E-06 ** 
(2.25) 
1.33E-05 ** 
(2.12) 
Property rights 0.102 *** 
(6.57) 
0.095 *** 
(5.07) 
0.101 *** 
(6.60) 
0.127 *** 
(4.54) 
0.063 * 
(1.76) 
Competence of civil 
service 
0.069 *** 
(2.80) 
 0.062 ** 
(2.12) 
0.075 *** 
(3.06) 
0.109 *** 
(3.02) 
Secondary school 
enrolment 
 0.003 *** 
(2.60) 
   
Trade openness   2.46E-04 
(0.46) 
  
Public trust in 
politicians 
   -0.055 
(-1.08) 
 
Transparency in 
government  
    0.010 
(0.42) 
εσˆ  0.081 0.086 0.083 0.081 0.083 
Nº of observations 20 20 20 20 16 
 
εσˆ  – Estimated standard deviation of ε. 
The z statistics are in brackets. 
*, **, *** - Significant at the 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.  
 
 
Table 6 – Corrected output efficiency scores (for Model 1)  
 DEA 
scores  
 
(1) 
GDP 
correction 
 
(2) 
Property 
rights 
correction 
(3) 
Civil 
servants  
correction 
(4) 
Corrected 
scores 
(5)=(1)+(2)+ 
(3)+(4) 
Corrected 
Rank 
Brazil 0.562 -0.033 0.018 -0.017 0.530 18 
Bulgaria 0.564 -0.036 -0.165 0.045 0.408 20 
Chile 0.823 -0.020 0.079 -0.037 0.844 6 
Czech Republic 0.735 0.019 -0.043 -0.024 0.687 12 
Estonia 0.753 -0.013 -0.003 0.024 0.762 10 
Greece 0.822 0.039 0.018 -0.058 0.820 8 
Hungary 0.792 0.002 0.048 0.011 0.853 5 
Ireland 0.999 0.145 0.130 0.066 1.000 1 
Korea 0.994 0.022 -0.013 0.024 1.000 1 
Latvia 0.742 -0.030 -0.053 0.031 0.690 11 
Lithuania 0.720 -0.025 -0.063 0.052 0.684 15 
Mauritius 0.914 -0.015 0.058 -0.003 0.954 3 
Mexico 0.730 -0.025 -0.023 -0.003 0.679 16 
Poland 0.723 -0.018 -0.023 0.004 0.686 13 
Portugal 0.782 0.044 0.048 -0.031 0.843 7 
Romania 0.621 -0.044 -0.033 -0.003 0.541 17 
Slovak Republic 0.777 0.000 0.038 -0.044 0.771 9 
Slovenia 0.843 0.036 -0.003 0.052 0.929 4 
South Africa 0.693 -0.005 0.048 -0.051 0.685 14 
Turkey 0.555 -0.043 -0.063 -0.037 0.411 19 
Average 0.757 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.739  
 
Note: the corrected scores do not always add up to the indicated sum since for the cases were the result was above 
one it was truncated to the unity. 
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Table 7 – Comparison of country scores and ranks across methods 
 
DEA Analyis Public Sector 
Efficiency (PSE) 
Two-step 
correction 
Country Input oriented Output oriented   
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Brazil  0.381 22 0.488 22 0.69 23 0.530 18 
Bulgaria  0.461 14 0.483 23 0.77 22 0.408 20 
Chile  0.73 4 0.615 17 1.38 5 0.844 6 
Cyprus  0.489 11 0.867 3 1.08 8 - - 
Czech Republic  0.439 15 0.637 13 0.85 17 0.687 12 
Estonia  0.489 12 0.632 14 0.91 12 0.762 10 
Greece  0.369 23 0.713 8 0.96 9 0.820 8 
Hungary  0.355 24 0.687 9 0.85 17 0.853 5 
Ireland  0.576 8 0.813 4 1.37 6 1.000 1 
Korea  0.749 3 0.743 6 1.65 3 1.000 1 
Latvia  0.486 13 0.624 16 0.91 12 0.690 11 
Lithuania  0.535 9 0.588 18 0.86 15 0.684 15 
Malta  0.408 19 0.753 5 0.78 21 - - 
Mauritius  0.721 5 0.686 10 1.56 4 0.954 3 
Mexico  0.703 6 0.551 19 1.31 7 0.679 16 
Poland  0.412 18 0.627 15 0.83 19 0.686 13 
Portugal  0.385 21 0.678 11 0.82 20 0.843 7 
Romania  0.528 10 0.509 21 0.86 15 0.541 17 
Singapore  1 1 1 1 2.39 1 - - 
Slovak Republic  0.406 20 0.674 12 0.92 11 0.771 9 
Slovenia  0.431 16 0.731 7 0.88 14 0.929 4 
South Africa  0.676 7 0.529 20 0.95 10 0.685 14 
Thailand  1 1 1 1 1.83 2 - - 
Turkey  0.416 17 0.482 24 0.63 24 0.411 19 
Correlation Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank   
(DEA input, PSE) 0.91 0.77       
(DEA output, PSE)   0.71 0.56     
(DEA output, two-step)   0.92 0.93     
(PSE, two-step)     0.69 0.65   
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